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In April, the guided-missile frigate CNS Yulin of the 25th Chinese naval escort task force received a message that pirates in the Gulf of Aden had hijacked the OS 35, a bulk carrier from Tuvalu.
Counter-Piracy off the coast of Somalia is a story of success. Until 22 December, 2013, the Chinese Task Forces have escorted 5460 ships including 2765 foreign ships. They have also escorted 7.
After a considerable period of absence, Turkish Navy is back in Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia.
In early September Turkish Prime Ministry Disaster & Emergency Management Authority dispatched an aid ship to Somaliland, Ethiopia and Putland. M/V Lila, loaded with 11 tons of aid, left Mersin, Turkey on 10 September 2016. Ada class corvette TCG Büyükada escorted the merchant ship on this voyage.
After the delivery of the aid, TCG Büyükada stayed in the region. She is now conducting anti-piracy patrols under Combined Task Force 151 command.
This is the second deployment of TCG Büyükada to the region. She was in the region from January till April 2015, and evacuated 55 Turkish citizens trapped in Yemen.
MV SINAR KUDUS
At approximately 0730Z on 16 March, the Bulk Cargo Carrier MV SINAR KUDUS was pirated approximately 320 nautical miles North East of the island of Socotra in the Somali Basin. Within 24 hours of being taken, she was used to launch an unsuccessful attack on the MV EMPEROR.
The MV SINAR KUDUS, which is Indonesian flagged and owned, was on its way to Suez (Egypt) from Singapore when it was attacked. Details of the attack are not known at this time but initial reports from the crew stated that 30 to 50 pirates had boarded and taken control of the vessel. The MV SINAR KUDUS has a crew of 20, all Indonesian.
Within 24 hours of the attack, the MV SINAR KUDUS was used to launch a further attack on the Liberian flagged Bulk Carrier MV EMPEROR. A skiff with 5 pirates on board was launched from the SINAR KUDUS and attacked the EMPEROR but was repelled by the armed force from the merchant vessel. The EMPEROR was subsequently reported to be safe.
The MV SINAR KUDUS and the MV EMPEROR were registered with MSC(HOA), and were reporting to UKMTO.
Chemical Tanker MV HANNIBAL II, was released from pirate control on 17 March 2011. The Panamanian flagged vessel was hijacked on 11 November 2010, approximately 860 nautical miles East of the Horn of Africa.
The vessel and her crew of 30 are believed to be making for a safe port. The crew members are from Tunisia, Philippines, Croatia, Georgia, Russia and Morocco.
The vessel had 31 crew members on board when she was taken but, as previously reported by the EU on the 17 December, EU NAVFOR joined the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) to evacuate a crew member after reports were received that he had a possible appendicitis.
According to the owner all the crew members are safe and in good health.
The danger of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin is high and continues to increase. Naval forces strongly recommend that yachts do not transit this area. Merchant ships use Best Management Practices (BMP) to win time for the naval forces to assist them. With a low freeboard and slow speed, yachts are particularly vulnerable to pirate attack. Any direct response from naval assets will depend on the proximity to the incident and may not occur. BMP3 and the self protection measures described in them were not designed for cruising yachts nor will they be sufficient to prevent boardings by Somali pirates.
NATO Shipping Centre flyer to yachts
ISAF Flyer
Link to ISAF guidelines
The NSC Alert Map includes the positions of pirated motherships as indicated by yellow circles – see the corresponding alerts for detailed information on time/course/speed where known and pictures where available. The current assessed areas of probable operation of Somali Pirate Attack Groups are represented in blue. The map will continue to be updated every weekday with the alerts from the past week.
During the reporting period (11-17 Mar 11) very limited piracy activities have been detected, although the general number of PAG operating in the area remains unchanged. Once the operational limits, locally caused by the rapidly changing weather conditions, have vanished, a general increase of pirate activities is expected.
Gulf of Aden/Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).
During the assessment period there have been no pirate activities in the GoA. However, the previous assessment that pirate skiffs might blend into the local traffic remains valid.
Arabian Sea/Greater Somali Basin.
During the past week (11-17 Mar) the majority of piracy activities were again concentrated between 10 and 20 degrees north and 60 and 70 degrees east. In this area there was one confirmed act of piracy, one attack, three approaches and three suspicious activities. Outside the area there were two suspicious activities in vicinity of Oman.
Pirates have continued to use dhow mother ships to launch their attack skiffs against any target of opportunity. A significant number of pirated regional dhows, particularly Iranian flagged Jelbut-type and Yemeni flagged Yemeni-type vessels are currently in pirate possession and regularly being taken out on mother ship operations, predominantly in the Arabian Sea. We currently assess that at least four such vessels are active in the Arabian Sea region and might even spread their activities into the eastern part of the GoA.
We currently assess that three whaler based Pirate Attack Groups (PAGs) are active in the southern Somalia basin. Still limited by the unfavourable weather conditions, it cannot be excluded that an increasing number of PAGs will commence actions in the Somalia basin once the weather improves.
Furthermore, in addition to the dhow mother ships it is likely pirates will continue to use some of the other vessels they currently hold for ransom as mother ships This includes fishing and large merchant vessels. There is a possibility that at least one is operating in the Arabian Sea.
This document is intended to advise Best Management Practices (BMP) to assist companies and ships in avoiding piracy attacks, deterring attacks and delaying successful attacks in the Gulf of Aden (GoA) and off the Coast of Somalia.
Click the link below to access Best Management Practices version 3 June 2010 on PDF and the accompanying video file “Merchant shipping self protection video”.
Hard copy of the BMP3 booklets will be provided for free when ordering anti piracy chart BA6099 at your national chart supplier.
Hard copy only, can be acquired from the publisher Witherbies. Please contact Mrs. Alison Hunter by email: alison@emailws.com for copies of the booklet.
Please note the example of a “High Risk Area Checklist”
Link to BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO DETER PIRACY 3
High Risk Area Checklist
The Merchant Shipping Self Protection Video is found below.
For watching on your computer use the Hi or Low res file, if you want to burn a CD or just save the video as a file on your computer use the ZIP Hi or Low res file.
Counter Piracy Video Low Res 48 MB
Counter Piracy Video Hi Res 178 MB
ZIP Counter Piracy Video Low Res
ZIP Counter Piracy Video Hi Res
Gulf Of Aden - Task Force Somalia Mac Os Catalina
Company crisis management procedures should include actions to be taken prior to vessel and crew release in the unfortunate event of a vessel being pirated. The preparation of a released vessel, including the provision of fuel and other necessary supplies to enable the ship to go to its intended next port, is not a task for military vessels. Consideration should be given to these issues in the event of any vessels being pirated. Although, on rare occasions in the past when a nation- for whatever reasons – provided national warship support to a released vessel, it was always at the cost of taking that warship away from its primary task preventing further seizures and the protection of the many instead of a single vessel. This will obviously not preclude warships from providing assistance to any vessel in distress or in need of aid, as mandated by the SOLAS convention, or humanitarian support if positioned to do so.
Gulf Of Aden - Task Force Somalia Mac Os 11
In order to encourage vessels to conduct their passage through the IRTC in groups based on passage speed MSC HOA will promulgate via their website, position, time, and speed for vessels to pass through a waypoint at the eastern and western limits of the IRTC. This process will be known as “GOA Group Transits” (GOA GT).
GOA GT timings will be at various intervals through each 24hr period. Each GOA GT will follow a recommended navigation track (NAVTRACK) through the IRTC at a published speed that will avoid high profile piracy danger periods and allow maximum coordination of military assets in support. Transit Group Schedules will cater for the differing range of speeds. Details can be found via MSC HOA website: http://www.mschoa.org
During your transit you should not expect to be permanently in company with a warship. But all warships in the GOA, whether part of NATO, EU NAVFOR or coordinating with MSC HOA, will be aware of the GOA GTs and have the full details of vulnerable shipping.
The implementation of the GOA GT is designed to enhance your security as you transit through the GOA.
In view of recent attacks / hijackings in the area between 47E & 49E and also the apparent lack of understanding of the “group transit” system, attention is drawn to the new explanation of the system in the PDF file “Group Transit Explanation” below. The area between 47E and 49E is statistically the most dangerous area for pirate attacks especially during daylight but, by following the group transit timings and speeds, this area is transited in darkness by all vessels in all speed groups.
It should be noted that statistics show that in 2010 there have been no successful attacks on vessels complying with group transit times and speeds. Therefore it is most important that ships using a group transit keep strictly to the correct time of entering the IRTC and maintain the correct speed over the ground throughout the transit.
Ship owners are requested to ensure that the masters of all their vessels, the company security officer and any other relevant shore personnel have access to this PDF document in order to improve understanding and compliance with the system.
